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Abstract
We compare monetary union to flexible exchange rates in an asymmetric, three-
country model with active monetary policy. Unlike the traditional OCA literature,
we find that countries with high nominal wage rigidities benefit from monetary union,
specially when they join other, similarly rigid countries. Countries with relatively
more flexible wages lose when they form a union with more rigid wage countries.
We study the France, Germany and the UK and find that wage asymmetries across
these three countries dominate other types of asymmetries (in shocks, monetary
policy etc.) in welfare comparisons. And that, if the UK had a substantially higher
degree of wage flexibility than France and Germany, then her participation in EMU
would be costly.
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Introduction
In 1999, several members of the European Union formed a monetary union. Others
opted to remain outside. A great deal of academic and political debate has surrounded
this event. It has focused both on the effects of EMU for macroeconomic stability in its
participant countries and on the wisdom of remaining outside once a currency union has
been formed.
This debate has taken place more or less within the traditional Mundell-Fleming
model and the associated optimum currency area (OCA) literature. A key result that
has emerged from this literature is that the cost of participation in monetary union
increases with (see de Grauwe, 2001): a) Dissimilarities in economic structure, and in
particular, in the degree of asymmetry in the shocks. b) The degree of nominal rigidities.
Countries with rigid nominal wages (prices) and asymmetries may want to retain the
exchange rate instrument in order to have an adjustment mechanism that could serve
as a substitute for the lack of nominal price adjustment (see also Friedman’s, 1953, case
for flexible exchange rates).
The choice of the exchange rate regime is a special case of the more general issue
of optimal monetary policy in an open economy. There is a new and fast expanding
literature that uses the New Keynesian Model (NKM)to investigate the performance
of alternative open economy monetary policy rules (Begigno and Benigno, 2000), the
macroeconomic and welfare properties of alternative exchange rate regimes (Collard
and Dellas, 2002, Devereux and Engle, 2001, Duarte, 2001, Kollmann, 2001) and the
welfare implications of different degrees of international policy coordination (Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba, 2002, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2002, Pappa, 2001, Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 2001). The message that emerges from this literature concerning the value
of the exchange rate instrument is more mixed. The results depend on the currency
denomination of trade, the structure (completeness) of financial markets, the type of
policy rule considered and differences in size across countries.
In this paper we extend this literature in several directions. First, we evaluate alter-
native exchange rate systems within a multi (three) country model. This allows us to
discuss the effects on the ”ins” and the ”outs” as well as the optimal choice of partner
as a function of various types of asymmetries. The choice of a partner is implicit in the
OCA literature but has not received any direct attention. A noteworthy exception is
Hughes-Hallet and Hougaard Jensen, 2001, who examine the incentives to participate
and or admit members in a monetary union in relationship to the level of economic
reform accomplished. Second, we examine the role of asymmetries across countries not
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only in the shocks (or economic size) as it is common in the existing literature but also
in labor markets. And third, we use a quantitative model to evaluate the various options
faced by the three largest economies in Europe, France, Germany and the UK.
Suppose that one classified France and Germany as high and the UK as low nominal
wage rigidity countries1. There are several questions of interest. a) Are France and
Germany better off –and by how much– in a currency union relative to regime of freely
floating rates? b) Does the answer to this question depend on the UK’s decision to
participate or not? c) Does the formation of monetary union have any significant external
effects on the –nonparticipant– UK (and vice versa)? d) Conditional on the existence of
a currency union involving mostly countries with inflexible labor (wage) markets, is it in
the best interest of the flexible economy’s (the UK) to join in? e) Are countries better
off when they form a union with countries that are alike (in terms of inflexibility) or with
countries that are different? While most of the existing literature deals with the first
question within two country models (Collard and Dellas, 2002) and much of the current
political debate is focusing on whether the UK would benefit from the adoption of the
Euro (question d), the list of the questions presented above suggests that this is but a
small subset of empirically relevant issues that may be worth exploring.
We address these questions within a general equilibrium, three country model whose
features include nominal wage rigidities2, active monetary policy (Taylor rules), complete
asset markets and a variety of shocks (supply, fiscal and monetary). Three international
monetary arrangements are considered: Flexible exchange rates for all three countries, a
two country monetary union with the third country pursuing a floating regime (we call
this ”mixed”) and a catholic monetary union. Our main results can be summarized as
follows:
In the benchmark case of perfect symmetry, countries are better off when they par-
ticipate in a currency union and the benefits increase with the number of participants.
The gains can be significant when the degree of nominal wage rigidity is high but they
tend to be small when rigidity is low. This contrasts with the traditional OCA analysis
as well as Friedman’s, 1953, case for flexible rates (namely, that they fare well when wage
rigidity is high) and obtains in spite of the fact that policy is activistic. The improvement
in welfare comes from two sources. First, from the existence of important supply and
monetary shocks. For fiscal shocks, flexible rates fare better (for the reasons suggested
1See Nickell, 1997, for some evidence on this.
2Other sources of nominal rigidities are possible. Our choice of wage rather than price rigidities is
motivated by recent empirical work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2001, that finds that the
former dominate.
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in the traditional OCA literature, see also Poole, 1970). And second, from the fact that
the model uses foreign intermediate goods in domestic production. This implies that an
exchange rate change that has favorable effects on the demand for domestic products has
unfavorable effects on the supply side of the economy as it increases the cost of domestic
production.
We also show that asymmetries in wage flexibility across countries play a more im-
portant role in the evaluation of alternative regimes than other types of asymmetries
(e.g. in the shocks, monetary policy etc.). Countries with substantial wage rigidities
benefit from monetary union, specially when their partners are equally rigid. Countries
with relatively more flexible wages are better off when they stay out. When we take
into account the various sources of actual asymmetries that exist in the EU, we find
that a substantially greater wage flexibility in the UK relative to France and Germany
would discourage her from forming a union with them. In contrast, France and Germany
always benefit from forming a currency union. Whether they would also like to include
the UK or not depends on the type of monetary policy rules considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the three
country model. Section 2 describes the calibration. Section 3 discusses the benchmark
case of perfect symmetry. Section 4 presents the main findings under wage asymmetry
and section 5 the general asymmetric case.
1 The model
The three countries are modelled in a similar fashion3 so we describe only one country,
the UK (a technical appendix to this paper, available at our website, offers a detailed
description of the other two countries).
The economy consists of a large number of identical households and firms, a fiscal
authority and a monetary authority.
1.1 The household
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility:
E0[
∑
t=∞
βtU(CSt , h
S
t )] (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, CSt denotes UK consumption in period t
and hSt is the number of hours worked by the UK representative household. U(C
S
t , h
S
t )
3Nevertheless, they may still differ in terms of size, economic structure, shocks and so on.
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is a utility function, increasing and concave in its first argument, and decreasing and
convex in its last argument. The following utility function will be used:
U(CSt , h
S
t ) = log(C
S
t ) + θ log(1− hSt ) (2)
where θ is a weight for the marginal utility of leisure.
In each and every period the UK household faces two budget constraints. The first
takes the form: In each and every period the UK household faces the following budget
constraint:
PSt C
S
t + P
S
t I
S
t +
∫
`
(
P˜Ft
eSt
BFS,t+1 +
eGt
eSt
P˜Gt B
G
S,t+1 + P˜
S
t B
S
S,t+1)d`+M
S
t+1 + P
S
t T
S
t
= WSt h
S
t + z
S
t K
S
t +Π
S
t +
BFS,t
eSt
+
eGt
eSt
BGS,t +B
S
S,t +M
S
t +N
S
t (3)
where PSt denotes the price of UK consumption and investment goods, I
S
t is investment,
eSt is the FF/BP exchange rate, e
G
t is the FF/DM rate (hence e
G
t /e
S
t is the BP/DM
rate), P˜ jt is the price paid for an asset that will deliver 1 unit of country j’s currency
(j = F, G, S) next period if state ` realizes. A typical UK household owns BjS,t such
assets entering period t. MSt is the stock of money held by the UK household in period
t, TSt is lump-sum taxes, W
S
t is the nominal wage, z
S
t is the rental rate for capital, K
S
t
is the physical capital stock at the beginning of period t, ΠSt are the profits of the UK
firms and NSt is a per-capita amount of money issued by the Bank of England (BoE)
and given to the households in the form of a helicopter drop.
According to the budget constraint, the households enters period t holding an amount
of money equal to Mt; it receives income from its financial investments, B
j
S,t, from its
labor services, from renting capital to the firms. It also receives its share of the profits
distributed by the firms and its share of the money injection by the BoE. It uses these
funds to buy new financial assets, to build its cash reserves, to pay taxes and to purchase
goods for consumption and investment purposes.
The household also faces a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on consumption pur-
chases:
PSt C
S
t ≤MSt (4)
Physical capital accumulates according to
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KSt+1 = Φ(
ISt
KSt
)KSt + (1− δ)KSt (5)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 denotes the rate of depreciation. The concave function Φ(.) captures
the presence of adjustment costs to investment. It is assumed to be twice differentiable
and homogenous of degree 0. Furthermore, we assume the absence of adjustment costs
in the steady state: Φ(γ+δ−1) = γ+δ−1, Φ′(γ+δ−1) = 1 and Φ′′(γ+δ−1)(γ+δ−1)Φ′(γ+δ−1) = ϕ.
Finally, we will assume that –at least a fraction of– the nominal wages is fixed one
period in advance4 at a level that is equal to the expected labor market clearing wage.
In particular, the fixed nominal wages are set using labor contracts of the form W jt =
(1− ϑ)W˜ jt + ϑEt−1W˜ jt where W˜ jt is the nominal wage that would clear the labor market
in a Walrasian framework, and 0 6 ϑ 6 1 is the share of labor contracts in the economy
The households that have signed labor contracts must then supply whatever quantity
of labor is demanded by the firms.
1.2 The firms
There are two types of firms, those that produce an intermediate good, Y , and those
that produce a final good, Q.
The production of the intermediate good is done according to:
Y St = a
S
t (K
S
t )
α(ΓthSt )
1−α (6)
where Kt denotes the physical capital stock at the beginning of period t. Γt represents
Harrod neutral, deterministic, technical progress evolving according to Γt = γΓt−1. γ ≥
1 denotes the deterministic rate of growth. aSt is a stationary, exogenous, stochastic
technology shock.5
The representative intermediate good firm chooses the quantity of capital and labor
to lease in period t in order to maximize its current profits
pit = PSY tY
S
t −WSt hSt − zSt KSt (7)
where PSY t is the price of the UK intermediate good.
The country specific intermediate goods are then combined to produce the final goods
in the three countries.
4Other sources of nominal rigidities are possible. Our choice of wage rather than price rigidities is
motivated by recent empirical work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2001, that finds that the
former dominate.
5The stochastic properties of the technology shock will be specified later.
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Y St = Y
S
Ft + Y
S
Gt + Y
S
St (8)
where Y Sj,t denotes the amount of UK intermediate good that is used as an input to
produce country j ’s final good in period t.
1.3 Production of the final domestic good
The production of the final good in the UK, QSt , takes place according to:
QSt = [$
1−ρ
4 (Y
F
S,t)
ρ +$1−ρ5 (Y GS,t)ρ +$
1−ρ
6 (Y
S
S,t)
ρ]
1
ρ (9)
The level of production is selected in order to maximize profits:
piS = PSt Q
S
t − P
F
Y t
eSt
Y FS,t − e
G
t
eSt
PGY tY
G
S,t − PSY tY SS,t (10)
where$4, is the weight of the French goods in the UK final good basket, $5, is the weight
of German goods in this basket and $6 denotes the weight of UK goods in the domestic
(UK) basket. Recall that Y jF,t is the amount of the intermediate good of country j (j = F,
G, S) used in the production of the UK final good. 1ρ−1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the domestic and foreign intermediate goods. This way of modelling import
and export activities is called the Armington aggregation and implies that the imported
goods have to be transformed into a domestic good, QSt , before they can be consumed
or used for investment. It follows that the three countries will have different price levels
for their final goods, P it , as these goods are not perfect substitutes.
Clearing of the UK final good market requires:
QSt = C
S
t + I
S
t +G
S
t (11)
where GS is UK government expenditure.
1.4 The government
In each period the government acquires an amount Gt of the final good. The cyclical
component of government expenditures (gt = Gt/Γt) is exogenously determined by a
stationary AR(1) process such that:
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1− ρg) log(g) + εgt (12)
with |ρg| < 1 and εgt   N (0, σg).
These expenditures are financed by means of lump–sum taxation
7
PSt G
S
t = P
S
t T
S
t (13)
1.5 The monetary authorities
The behavior of the monetary authorities depends on the international monetary ar-
rangement in place. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, we assume that monetary
authorities pursue active monetary policy. In particular, central banks are assumed to
follow a forward looking Taylor rule. For instance, in the UK this rule takes the form6
R̂St = ρ
S
r R̂
S
t−1 + (1− ρS)(KSy Et(Ŷ St+1) +KSΠEt(Π̂St+1)) + ζSr,t (14)
where RSt is the gross nominal interest rate, ρ
S
r denotes the degree of interest rate smooth-
ing, Et(Ŷ St+1) is expected output (relative to target), Et(Π̂
S
t+1) is expected CPI inflation
(relative to target) and ζSr,t is an exogenous policy shock (for instance, a change in the
inflation target or variation in the nominal interest rate that is not due to a response of
the BoE to deviations of inflation or output growth from their target levels). KSy and
KSΠ are fixed weights.
The supply of money evolves according to
MSt+1 = µ
S
t M
S
t (15)
where µt is the gross rate of growth. This is selected endogenously in order to satisfy
the constraint imposed by the nominal interest rate policy.
In addition to the flexible exchange rate system we consider a monetary union by
France and Germany with the UK adhering to a floating rate (we call this regime
”mixed”); and a monetary union of all three countries. In a monetary union, policy
is conducted according to a Taylor rule constructed as a weighed average of the rules of
the participant countries. We have also experimented with an alternative rule for the
Union which postulates that the union Taylor rule uses the parameters of the German
rule.
1.6 The equilibrium
We now turn to the description of the equilibrium of the economy.
6We have also experimented with Taylor rules that include an exchange rate target. As it is commonly
reported in the literature, such specifications do not find much of an independent role for exchange rate
policy.
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Definition 1 An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices
{Pt}∞t=0 =
{
W jt , z
j
t , P
j
t , P
j
Y t, P
j
bt(s
′), Rjt , eGt , eSt
}∞
t=0
j ∈ (F,G, S)
and a sequence of quantities
{Qt}∞t=0 =
{{QHt }∞t=0 ,{QFt }∞t=0}
with {QHt }∞t=0 = {{Cjt , Ijt ,{Bjit+1}i∈(F,G,S) ,Kjt+1,M jt+1}j∈(F,G,S)
}∞
t=0
and {QFt }∞t=0 = {{Kjt , hjt , Y jt ,{Y jit}i∈(F,G,S) , Qjt}j∈(F,G,S)
}∞
t=0
such that:
(i) given a sequence of prices {Pt}∞t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {QHt }∞t=0 is a solution
to the representative household’s problem;
(ii) given a sequence of prices {Pt}∞t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {QFt }∞t=0 is a solution
to the representative firms’ problem;
(iii) given a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and a sequence of shocks, {Pt}∞t=0 clears the
goods markets
QFt = C
F
t + I
F
t +G
F
t (16)
QGt = C
G
t + I
G
t +G
G
t (17)
QSt = C
S
t + I
S
t +G
S
t (18)
Y Ft = Y
F
Ft + Y
F
Gt + Y
F
St (19)
Y Gt = Y
G
Ft + Y
G
Gt + Y
G
St (20)
Y St = Y
S
Ft + Y
S
Gt + Y
S
St (21)
as well as the financial, money and capital markets.
(iv) Nominal wages are set using labor contracts of the form W jt = (1 − ϑ)W˜ jt +
ϑEt−1W˜ jt where W˜
j
t is the nominal wage that would clear the labor market in a
Walrasian framework, and 0 6 ϑ 6 1 is the share of labor contracts in the econ-
omy.
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2 Model parameterization: Calibration
We have solved the model under two sets of parameters. The first one forms the basis
for most of the analysis conducted in this paper. It imposes perfect symmetry across
countries in all but a single dimension. We have investigated different types of asym-
metries (differences in the Taylor rules, in the properties of the exogenous shocks, etc.)
but we present only the results associated with asymmetry in the degree of nominal
wage flexibility as this turns out to be the most important source of asymmetry7. The
parameter values used are similar to those typically used in the open economy literature
(see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1995, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000, and Collard
and Dellas, 2002). They are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Calibration I
Discount factor β 0.998
Rate of real growth γ 1.00672
Depreciation rate δ 0.020
Labor share 1− α 0.65
Substitution between domestic and foreign goods ρ 0.25
Adjustment cost ϕ -0.174
Weight of home goods in home GDP $ii 0.80
Trade interdependence between i and j $ij 0.10
Persistence of technology shock ρa 0.90
Volatility (sd) of technology shock σa 0.008
Persistence of government spending shock ρg 0.95
Volatility (sd) of government spending shock σg 0.02
Money supply gross rate of growth µ 1.0228
Interest rate smoothing ρr 0.80
Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule KΠ 1.50
Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule Ky 0.10
Persistence of policy shock ρm 0.0
Volatility (sd) of policy rule shock σr 0.0024
In the second calibration, the parameter values (except of those governing the fiscal
and supply shocks) are selected in order to match various features of the data. A subset
of these parameters, namely, β, γ, δ, α, ρ, ϕ, $ii and $ij) is assumed to take the
common values appearing in table 1, as differences across countries are negligible. Table
2 reports the values of the second calibration. The parameters of the Taylor rules in
the three countries were selected so that the model could replicate the volatility of
7The remaining results can be found at http://www-vwi.unibe.ch/ amakro/resear
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inflation and nominal interest rates as well as their first order autocorrelation in the
data. The remaining parameters, describing the shocks in the three economies under
consideration, were estimated. Both the calibration and the estimation of the is done over
the period 1970:1–1989:4 in order to avoid the break associated with German unification.
Nevertheless, the results do not differ when we carry out the calibration and estimation
using the 1970-1999 sample. Note, also, that this period corresponds more or less to
a period of freely floating exchange rates even for France as the exchange rate did not
serve as a restriction on French monetary policy until German unification.
The supply shocks are constructed as follows. We use data on employment and the
capital stock as well as the assumed value of α to build Solow residual series for the
three economies. The resulting series are detrended using a deterministic trend. We
then estimate a VAR(1) model of the form αt = ραt−1 + , namely aFtaGt
aSt
 =  ρaF aF ρaF aG ρaF aSρaGaF ρaGaG ρaGaS
ρaSaF ρaSaG ρaSaS
 aFt−1aGt−1
aSt−1
+ εFtεGt
εSt
 (22)
where ρ is  0.52 0.17 0−0.33 0.88 0
0 0 0.73
 (23)
and the variance covariance matrix of  is given by 2.41E − 051.13E − 05 3.39E − 05
1.12E − 05 2.74E − 05 0.000111
 (24)
As can be seen, volatility is much higher in the UK relative to France and Germany.
We use data on government consumption to estimate the fiscal process. The persis-
tence parameters are
ρFg ρ
G
g ρ
S
g
0.977 0.856 0.837
and the volatilities (sd)
σFg σ
G
g σ
S
g
0.0205 0.025 0.023
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Table 2: Calibration II: FR-DE-UK
Discount factor β 0.998
Rate of real growth γ 1.00672
Depreciation rate δ 0.020
Labor share 1− α 0.65
Substitution between domestic and foreign goods ρ 0.25
Adjustment cost ϕ -0.174
Share of home goods in French GDP $FF 0.93
Share of home goods in German GDP $GG 0.94
Share of home goods in UK GDP $SS 0.93
Share of French goods in German GDP $FG 0.04
Share of French goods in UK GDP $FS 0.035
Share of German goods in French GDP $GF 0.05
Share of German goods in UK GDP $GS 0.035
Share of UK goods in French GDP $SF 0.02
Share of UK goods in German GDP $SG 0.02
Gross growth rate of money supply µ 1.0228
Autocorrelation in Taylor rule in France ρrF 0.92
Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule in France KΠ 1.19
Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule in France Ky 0.38
Volatility (sd) of policy rule shock in France σr 0.0001
Autocorrelation in Taylor rule in Germany ρrF 0.12
Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule in Germany KΠ 1.22
Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule in Germany Ky 0.01
Volatility (sd) of policy rule shock in Germany σr 0.0086
Autocorrelation in Taylor rule in the UK ρrF 0.19
Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule in the UK KΠ 1.73
Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule in the UK Ky 0.34
Volatility (sd) of policy rule shock in the UK σr 0.0065
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2.1 Solution
The solution to the model involves 4 steps:
1. Adjusting the variables for both technological progress and nominal growth (that
is, making the model stationary)
2. Calculating the deterministic steady state
3. Log–linearizing the system around the steady state
4. Solving the resulting dynamic system
These steps are standard. Their details appear in the technical appendix to this
paper (available at http://www-vwi.unibe.ch/ amakro/resear).
The solution to the model is used to compute the impact effects of the shocks on
the variables of interest (in the form of elasticities), the standard deviation of these
variables and a variance decomposition of output and inflation. Using the solutions we
also generate the variance covariance matrix of consumption and leisure and use it to
compute welfare relying on a quadratic approximation to the utility function as suggested
by Woodford, 2000.
In the next two sections we study three hypothetical economies as a means of gaining
intuition about how different features of the model influence the properties of alternative
monetary arrangements. For this purpose we use the parameters of the first calibration.
We then turn attention to three actual economies, France, Germany and the UK and
use a calibration (calibration II) that reflects the properties of these three economies.
3 The symmetric case
Here we report results in the case where all three countries are perfectly symmetric.
Tables 3–4 report macroeconomic volatility and welfare under the three international
monetary arrangements for high (ϑ = 1) and relatively low (ϑ = 0.5) nominal wage
flexibility. Throughout this section we assume zero international correlation for the
shocks.
Welfare is highest when all three countries participate in a monetary union. The
benefits are greater when the degree of nominal wage rigidity is high, a finding that
contrasts with the conventional view –owing to Friedman’s celebrated case for flexible
exchange rates– that the cost of monetary union is increasing in the degree of nominal
price rigidity. Note that this obtains in spite of the fact that monetary policy is active
13
(a Taylor rule) under flexible rates. This result is due to four factors8. a) The more
flexible the wages, the smaller the relevance of the monetary regime in place for eco-
nomic activity (the closer we are to money neutrality) and welfare. Hence significant
non neutralities are a precondition for the monetary regime to have significant effects.
b) While a currency union amplifies the effects of country specific supply shocks on the
economic activity of the participants (by inducing real wage changes even in countries
that have not experienced a productivity shock), it contributes to greater output sta-
bility by limiting terms of trade effects (see below). Hence, the effect is ambiguous for
supply shocks. For monetary shocks, monetary union has an advantage over the flexible
exchange rate regime because such shocks are common and thus do not require terms
of trade changes. c) Friedman stressed nominal exchange movements as a substitute for
nominal goods price flexibility in allowing for the appropriate response of the terms of
trade. In our case, the nominal rigidity is in the labor markets so the terms of trade
are not hindered by the absence of exchange rate movements (specially when they are
assisted by suitable monetary policy). Moreover, Friedman’s argument was based on
aggregate demand shocks exclusively. And d) there is direct production interdependence
across countries through trade in intermediate goods. In such an environment, when
an exchange rate change (a currency depreciation) has favorable effects on the demand
for domestic goods it has offsetting unfavorable effects on the domestic cost of produc-
tion. And e) the superior performance of monetary union obtains only under supply and
money demand shocks. For fiscal shocks, a free float performs better. This is related to
Poole’s, 1970, analysis of money and interest rate rules for IS and LM shocks. Note that
supply and monetary shocks are the dominant source of variability in our model (see the
variance decompositions below in tables 7-9).
Finally, there are international spill over effects associated with the decision to or
not participate in a currency union. In particular, the participants are harmed by an-
other country’s decision not to join. The ”out’s” level of welfare is not affected by its
nonparticipation.
4 Wage asymmetries
In this section we maintain the assumption that the three countries are identical in
all respects except for the labor markets. In particular, we let the degree of nominal
wage rigidity differ across countries. We assume that the third country (we will call it
8We later explain why our result also differs from those obtained in the new Keynesian which also
tend to favor flexible rates.
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for reasons of convenience ”UK”) has more flexible nominal wages than the other two
countries (which we will call ”France” and ”Germany respectively. Our parameterization
in this section is as in table 1 and with ϑF = ϑG = 1 and ϑS = 0.5.
Tables 5–6 report macroeconomic volatility and welfare and tables 7–9 the variance
decompositions.
Several patterns emerge:
First, while rigid wage countries are better off in a monetary union independent
of the flexible wage country’s decision to participate or not (but they prefer catholic
participation to a limited union), the latter is better off a on flexible exchange rate
regime (independent of what the other countries do).
Second, there are spill over effects associated with a limited union. The ”ins” do not
reap all the benefits that are available had everybody participated. The ”out” is not
affected as long as the participants are perfectly symmetric.
Third, while the limited union leaves welfare in the ”out” unaffected, the reduced
volatility in the union translates into a small reduction in the volatility of the nominal
and real exchange rate vis a vis the ”out”.
What is the main reason for the increase in the volatility of real economic activity
–and the accompanying reduction in welfare– in the flexible wage country (the UK) in
EMU? In order to shed light on this pattern we need to look at the effects of individual
shocks. For the sake of space, we have not included the tables reporting the impact
effects. They can be found at http://www.vwi.unibe.ch/amakro/resear/.
Consider a positive UK productivity shock. UK output increases and the UK price
deflator decreases. Under flexible rates, the BP appreciates. The appreciation works
against the deterioration in the UK terms of trade that arises from the drop in the
nominal price of the British goods. The net effect turns out to be a small real appreciation
of the BP which reduces the expansionary effect of the productivity shock. Hence, the
flexible regime has stabilizing properties.
Under EMU, the nominal exchange rate effect is absent, so the drop in British prices
leads to a substantial real depreciation of the BP. This improves UK international com-
petitiveness and amplifies the effect of the supply shock on output. Furthermore , this
is not the only amplifying effect associated with EMU. Under flexible rates, the nomi-
nal appreciation of the BP has a negative effect on prices in the UK. This pushes the
real wage up constraining the expansion in output. This channel is absent in the EMU.
Consequently, UK employment expands more in EMU following a domestic productivity
shock.
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Consider now a positive, UK monetary shock9. Under flexible rates, the increase in
the interest rate leads to a nominal and real appreciation of the BP, reducing employment
and output in the UK. In EMU, the policy shock comes from the ECB and affects all
countries. Because of differences in the degree of nominal wage rigidity across countries,
the drop in nominal wages and prices is greater in the UK than in France and Germany.
As a result, the UK experiences a deterioration in its terms of trade, which works against
the contractionary effects of the higher interest rate. The net effect is positive and can
be quite large when trade elasticities are high.
The preceding discussion suggests that ECB monetary policy may not serve the needs
of all its members equally well even in the face of a common shock. To see this point,
assume that the ECB responds to a uniform overheating of the Euro zone by raising the
interest rate. Any given interest rate increase will have a larger contractionary effect on
Germany and France than in the UK not only because of its larger –negative– effect on
the real wage in those countries but also because it results in a deterioration of the UK
terms of trade, which shifts demand towards the UK good.
How robust are these findings with regard to plausible changes in the parameter
values? We have carried out several exercises involving changes in the parameters of
the model (more detailed results are available at the web site http://www-vwi.unibe.ch/
amakro/resear. We briefly summarize the main results but it is worth stating that the
patterns documented above are not affected.
The gains accruing to rigid wage economies from participation in EMU are increas-
ing: in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, the degree of
openness and the lack of aggressiveness in monetary policy reaction to inflation devel-
opments (a low Kpi). Interestingly, unlike the standard view (see de Grauwe, 2001) the
degree of cross country correlation in the shocks only plays a minor role. The same is
also true regarding the degree of persistence in the shocks.
Similarly, the loss to the more flexible wage countries from participation in EMU are
increasing in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and the
lack of aggressiveness in monetary policy reaction to inflation developments (a low Kpi)
but decreasing in the degree of openness.
Before moving to other types of asymmetry it may be interesting to ask what type
of currency partner would a rigid wage country prefer if she could chose. For instance,
would she be better off forming a union with countries that are alike her or with countries
that have more flexible labor markets? Table 10 reports welfare in a limited union
9Note, that due to the UK’s high wage flexibility, such shocks are of less importance there. See the
variance decompositions reported in tables 7-9.
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involving one high and one low rigidity economy (that is, the other rigid wage country
is left outside). The comparison of this table to 6 shows that the rigid are better off
associating with the rigid.
Other types of asymmetry
In order to prepare the ground for the real world case of France, Germany and the
UK that will be considered in the next section, we have also investigated the role of
additional sources of asymmetry: Namely, cross country differences in the volatility of
supply and monetary shocks as well as in the conduct of monetary policy. We have
carried out the analysis either allowing for a single source of asymmetry or maintaining
the wage asymmetry along side with the additional asymmetry. The results are available
at the web site http://www-vwi.unibe.ch/ amakro/resear. They can be summarized as
follows.
First, stronger10 inflation targeting, that is a higher Kpi, increases welfare in our
model. Hence, the UK’s loss of adopting the Euro would be lower if the ECB were a
stricter inflation pursuer than the BoE. Second, there is no significant change in the UK
losses from EMU participation when the variance of the UK supply shock is higher than
those in France and Germany. But while this extra relative volatility is of no consequence
for the UK’s decision to adopt the Euro, it matters for France and Germany who no longer
benefit from UK participation. Third, the same result obtains when we consider a more
volatile policy shock in the UK.
5 The real world case: France, Germany and the UK
We now turn to the implications of alternative international monetary arrangements
for three specific European economies, namely, France, Germany and the UK. For this
purpose we use the second calibration. In this calibration we have assumed that all
nominal wages in France and Germany are set in advance (ϑ = 1), while in the UK, half
are set in advance and the other half are flexible (ϑ = 0.5). While the precise values used
are arbitrary (there is widespread uncertainty about the degree of nominal wage rigidity),
they reflect the presumption that the UK labor market is considerably more flexible than
that in France and in Germany. We will see below that significant asymmetry in wage
rigidity across countries is required in order to discourage participation in monetary
union, independent of the average degree of wage flexibility in the three countries.
10But not too strong otherwise there is indeterminacy. As discussed by King, 2000, indeterminacy can
arise when policy responds too aggressively to expectation of future inflation
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Tables 11-12 report the main findings11. The UK prefers a system in which everybody
floats freely. She suffers a welfare loss when France and Germany form a currency
union12. But she would suffer an even bigger loss if she became part of the union herself.
Her entry, though, would be welcome by France and Germany who prefer a catholic to
a limited union.
The driving force behind the finding that the UK would prefer to stay out is the
assumption that the UK has considerably more flexible nominal wages than France and
Germany. The other forms of asymmetry do not play a critical role. Moreover, even
the absolute level of wage flexibility in the three countries does not matter much in
the absence of differences in rigidity across countries. For instance, in the benchmark
calibration with ϑF = 1 and ϑG = 1, the degree of price flexibility in the UK required to
make her indifferent between joining or not joining is ϑUK = .6. With the configuration
{ϑF , ϑG, ϑUK}= {.6, .6, .3} the UK again prefers to remain outside. With a smaller
asymmetry and more flexible wages, say, the configuration {.4, .4, .2}, she prefers to
join. One can conclude that asymmetry in the degree of wage rigidity is more important
than the absolute level of rigidity.
In our model, the world consists of three countries, all of which join or consider
joining a currency union. It is of interest to modify our specification in order to have a
third player outside the union when the UK participates in EMU. This is particularly
important as both the current members of EMU and the UK have important trade links
with the US. We thus combined France and Germany into a single country (by taking the
average; for the Taylor rule, we also considered the case where the ECB simply adopts
Bundesbank’s historical rule), the UK as the second country and the US as the third
country. We changed our parameterization accordingly. In this experiment we assumed
that wage rigidity in the US was comparable to that in the UK while it was higher in
Franco-Germania. As can be seen, adding the US does not change the UK’s incentive to
not participate in EMU (see table 14). That is, the UK still prefers a flexible system to
forming a currency union with a country that has greater wage rigidity. It is also worth
mentioning that if the UK were already in EMU and could not, for whatever reason,
leave (her first best), she would welcome a currency union between the Euro zone and
the other flexible wage country, the US (her second best). Or even better, she would
prefer forming a currency union with the US herself.
11The results are robust to assuming that the ECB inherits the Taylor rule of the Bundesbank rather
than using the FR-DE average. See Begg et al, 2002, for a thorough analysis of monetary policy in the
Euro area.
12Allowing the Bank of England to target the EUR-BP rate while remaining formally outside EMU
always makes the UK worse off relative to not targeting this rate.
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Finally, we repeated the analysis using estimated rather than calibrated Taylor
rules (the estimated rules and the associated results are again reported at http://www-
vwi.unibe.ch/amakro/resear). Again, we found the UK is made worse off by joining the
currency union and this is independent of whether the ECB rule is the average of those
in the three countries or simply the Bundesbank rule. Moreover, in the former case, the
UK’s entry is welcome by the other two countries, while in the latter, it is not. Never-
theless, given the difficulties associated with characterizing monetary policy we do not
want to make too much of this finding.
5.1 Comparison to the literature
The last couple of years have witnessed a proliferation of works that use two country,
general equilibrium models to study issues of monetary policy as well as international
monetary arrangements. This literature uses diverse ”formats” and produces even more
diverse findings. Nevertheless, the main conclusion that seems to emerge from this liter-
ature (at least under producer currency pricing) is that a flexible exchange rate system
with independent national monetary policies fares better than regimes that restrict ex-
change rate fluctuations (Begigno and Begigno, 2000, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001, Pappa,
2001). We, on the other hand, find that under symmetry (which is the standard as-
sumption in this literature) monetary union is beneficial, specially when nominal wage
rigidity is high.
There are three reasons for this divergence of findings. First, unlike our model where
monetary policy is ad hoc, the works mentioned above assume that monetary policy
is conducted optimally, that is, it aims at maximizing the utility of the representative
agent. In combination with the assumption that the monetary authorities have complete
information about the structure of the economy and the shocks, these models tend then
to generate equilibria that replicate the efficient, flexible price (or wage) equilibrium.
As Dellas (2001) has argued, when monetary policy can accomplish so much, you do
not want to constraint it by making it target the exchange rate. This is specially true
when beggar-thy-neighbor effects associated with independent policies are not strong
(for instance, when domestic and foreign goods are poor substitutes, see Pappa, 2001).
The second reason that floating rates tend to be favored in this literature is that
when prices are rigid, fixing the exchange rate takes away a mechanism that can be used
to bring about desired relative price changes (Friedman’s case for flexible rates). But in
our case, prices are flexible (it is wages that are rigid) so that exchange rate flexibility
is not as essential.
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And the third reason is that, abstracting from beggar-thy-neighbor effects (which are
missing from our analysis due to the non-optimizing specification of monetary policy),
the ability to manipulate the nominal exchange rate is more useful when there is no pro-
duction interdependence across countries. In the new literature, trade typically involves
only consumption goods. As we have already explained above, the assumption of trade
in intermediate goods generates offsetting effects on the cost of production following an
exchange rate change, making the exchange rate instrument less useful.
5.2 Some caveats
Before concluding let us state three important caveats. First, among the reasons often
offered in favor of a common currency is the elimination of the possibility of excessive,
non-fundamental fluctuations in the nominal exchange rates. Our model completely ab-
stracts from this. Very little is known about the macroeconomic and welfare implications
of this possibility. To the extent that non-fundamental fluctuations in the exchange rates
are substantial and have significant adverse effects, our conclusions ought to be qualified
as the model would tend to bias the comparisons in favor of the flexible regime.
Second, there are other benefits associated with monetary union that our analysis has
completely abstracted from. For instance, transactions costs for international but within
the eurozone transactions become lower, price comparisons may become more transpar-
ent and so on. Consequently, it should be kept in mind that our welfare comparisons are
conditional on the actual features of the model, not on the whole set of possible benefits
and costs that have been suggested in the literature.
And third, it should be noted that the welfare differences across regimes are quite
small. This is invariably the case in all general equilibrium, monetary policy models with
complete asset markets and representative agents. The differences in macroeconomic
volatility, on the other hand, are quite substantial.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the properties of monetary union in a three country world character-
ized by –possibly different degrees of– nominal wage rigidity. The main finding is that
countries with high nominal wage rigidities tend to benefit from monetary union. These
benefits increase with the size of the union, and also with the degree of wage rigidity in
the partner countries. Flexible wage countries are welcomed but are not the preferred
partners. Unlike the rigid wage countries, those with relatively more flexible nominal
wages tend to fare better under flexible exchange rates. Their welfare and macroeconomic
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performance is not affected by what other countries do.
We have applied the analysis to France, Germany and the UK, using parameter values
that reflect the asymmetries actually observed across these three countries. We find that
the UK’s relatively flexible labor markets make it costly for her to form a currency union
with rigid wage countries. France and Germany are better off in a monetary union.
Whether they would also welcome the UK in EMU depends on the properties of the
Taylor rules employed by the ECB.
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Symmetry
Table 3: Volatility, all shocks, symmetry
High wage rigidity (ϑ = 1) Low wage rigidity (ϑ = 0.5)
Flexible Mixed EMU Flexible Mixed EMU
DE-FR-UK DE-FR UK DE-FR-UK DE-FR-UK DE-FR UK DE-FR-UK
Q 2.15 2.10 2.15 2.08 2.51 2.20 2.51 2.08
x 2.47 2.45 2.47 2.44 2.43 2.44 2.43 2.44
h 1.70 1.21 1.70 1.00 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.77
pi 1.26 0.88 1.26 0.70 3.28 1.96 3.28 1.24
c 2.24 1.95 2.24 1.85 3.76 2.62 3.76 2.11
q 1.95 1.72 1.72 0.70 5.29 4.60 4.60 0.67
s 2.93 0.00 2.54 0.00 6.32 0.00 5.47 0.00
Note: Standard deviation of output (Q), intermediate good (x), employment (h), CPI inflation (pi),
consumption (c), terms of trade (q) and nominal exchange rate (s).
Table 4: Welfare, all shocks, symmetry
High wage rigidity (ϑ = 1) Low wage rigidity (ϑ = 0.5)
Flexible Mixed EMU Flexible Mixed EMU
DE-FR-UK DE-FR UK DE-FR-UK DE-FR-UK DE-FR UK DE-FR-UK
Supply -0.0332 -0.0195 -0.0332 -0.0150 -0.0140 -0.0123 -0.0140 -0.0117
Fiscal -0.0258 -0.0268 -0.0258 -0.0271 -0.0251 -0.0254 -0.0251 -0.0255
Money -0.1243 -0.0472 -0.1243 -0.0215 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001
All -0.1833 -0.0935 -0.1833 -0.0636 -0.0398 -0.0379 -0.0398 -0.0373
Note: The entries give the steady state consumption equivalent of the cost of fluctuations (multiplied by
1000).
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Wage Asymmetry
Table 5: Volatility, all shocks, wage asymmetry
Flexible Mixed EMU
DE-FR UK DE-FR UK DE-FR UK
Q 2.16 2.49 2.10 2.49 2.09 2.10
x 2.48 2.44 2.46 2.44 2.45 2.48
h 1.74 0.80 1.28 0.80 1.11 0.85
pi 1.28 3.24 0.90 3.24 0.78 1.05
c 2.25 3.73 1.96 3.73 1.87 2.01
q 1.95 3.80 0.70 3.69 0.70 0.77
s 2.93 4.78 0.00 4.55 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard deviation of output (Q), intermediate good (x), employment (h), CPI inflation (pi),
consumption (c), terms of trade (q) and nominal exchange rate (s).
Table 6: Welfare, wage asymmetry
Flexible Mixed EMU
DE-FR UK DE-FR UK DE-FR UK
Supply -0.0352 -0.0147 -0.0215 -0.0147 -0.0177 -0.0163
Fiscal -0.0258 -0.0252 -0.0267 -0.0252 -0.0272 -0.0253
Money -0.1322 -0.0009 -0.0551 -0.0009 -0.0334 -0.0047
All -0.1931 -0.0408 -0.1033 -0.0408 -0.0782 -0.0463
Note: The entries give the steady state consumption equivalent of the cost of fluctuations (multiplied by
1000).
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Table 7: Variance decomposition: Flexible
k εFa ε
G
a ε
S
a ε
F
g ε
G
g ε
S
g ε
F
r ε
G
r ε
B
r
QF , QG
1 16.62 0.26 1.09 2.08 0.10 0.10 75.01 0.96 3.78
40 82.60 0.06 0.21 2.38 0.05 0.05 13.77 0.17 0.71
QS
1 0.06 0.06 96.85 0.08 0.08 2.24 0.26 0.26 0.11
40 0.02 0.02 97.08 0.05 0.05 2.41 0.04 0.04 0.29
piF , piG
1 62.22 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.06 0.06 32.16 1.84 3.20
40 53.80 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.04 42.71 1.12 1.96
piS
1 0.41 0.41 37.19 0.02 0.02 0.05 2.53 2.53 56.84
40 0.38 0.38 37.49 0.01 0.01 0.05 2.30 2.30 57.08
Table 8: Variance decomposition: Mixed
k εFa ε
G
a ε
B
a ε
F
g ε
G
g ε
B
g ε
E
r ε
B
r
QF , QG
1 53.33 6.39 1.17 3.07 0.00 0.10 31.85 4.09
40 89.80 1.09 0.21 2.58 0.03 0.05 5.51 0.73
QS
1 0.06 0.06 96.85 0.08 0.08 2.24 0.53 0.10
40 0.02 0.02 97.08 0.05 0.05 2.41 0.08 0.29
piF , piG
1 66.12 7.35 0.49 0.67 0.01 0.13 18.80 6.43
40 45.91 15.14 0.32 0.43 0.03 0.08 34.22 3.87
piS
1 0.41 0.41 37.19 0.02 0.02 0.05 5.06 56.84
40 0.38 0.38 37.49 0.01 0.01 0.05 4.61 57.07
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Table 9: Variance decomposition: EMU
k εFa ε
G
a ε
B
a ε
F
g ε
G
g ε
B
g ε
U
r
QF ,QG
1 67.58 3.20 3.00 3.55 0.03 0.05 22.59
40 92.34 0.54 0.50 2.67 0.04 0.04 3.87
QS
1 0.29 0.29 94.43 0.01 0.01 2.10 2.87
40 0.07 0.07 96.84 0.03 0.03 2.38 0.58
piF ,piF
1 73.74 5.39 5.06 1.13 0.06 0.09 14.53
40 43.78 10.43 9.98 0.66 0.04 0.05 35.06
piS
1 7.60 7.60 51.40 0.04 0.04 1.02 32.30
40 9.86 9.86 45.80 0.05 0.05 0.91 33.47
Table 10: Choosing the right partner: Welfare comparisons
Flexible Mixed EMU
DE-FR UK DE UK FR DE-FR UK
Supply -0.0362 -0.0147 -0.0351 -0.0245 -0.0368 -0.0182 -0.0164
Fiscal -0.0256 -0.0250 -0.0267 -0.0252 -0.0256 -0.0271 -0.0252
Money -0.1379 -0.0010 -0.1120 -0.0212 -0.1387 -0.0353 -0.0044
All -0.1997 -0.0407 -0.1738 -0.0709 -0.2012 -0.0806 -0.0460
Note: The entries give the steady state consumption equivalent of the cost of fluctuations (multiplied by
1000). In the mixed system ( limited currency union), a rigid, ϑ = 1 country (DE) forms a currency
with a flexible ϑ = 0.5 country (the UK); the other rigid (FR) remains outside.
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Table 11: Macroeconomic volatility: DE–FR–UK, all shocks
Flexible Mixed EMU
FR DE UK FR DE UK FR DE UK
Q 1.53 1.47 2.09 1.56 1.36 2.10 1.47 1.32 2.02
x 1.45 1.53 2.11 1.38 1.39 2.11 1.29 1.34 2.14
h 2.30 1.36 0.83 1.77 1.25 0.84 1.60 1.08 0.90
pi 0.98 0.73 1.69 0.67 0.76 1.72 0.63 0.71 1.40
c 1.33 1.46 2.46 1.19 1.35 2.48 1.25 1.31 2.01
q 1.09 1.88 1.70 0.48 1.79 1.74 0.47 1.04 0.95
s 3.03 3.33 2.47 0.00 0.00 2.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard deviation of output, Q, employment, h, CPI inflation, pi, consumption, c, terms of trade,
q, and nominal exchange rate,s. In the real and nominal exchange rate rows, under each monetary
regime, the first entry refers to France–Germany, the second to Germany–UK and the third to France-
UK. ϑDE = 1, ϑFR = 1, ϑUK = 0.5.
Table 12: Welfare comparisons, DE–FR–UK
Flexible Mixed EMU
FR DE UK FR DE UK FR DE UK
Supply -0.0291 -0.0109 -0.0326 -0.0144 -0.0122 -0.0336 -0.0198 -0.0189 -0.0342
Fiscal -0.3069 -0.0171 -0.0108 -0.1223 -0.0237 -0.0107 -0.1092 -0.0206 -0.0126
Money -0.0014 -0.0899 -0.0001 -0.0624 -0.0636 -0.0005 -0.0337 -0.0344 -0.0051
All -0.3374 -0.1179 -0.0434 -0.1991 -0.0995 -0.0448 -0.1626 -0.0739 -0.0519
Note: The entries give the steady state consumption equivalent of the cost of fluctuations (multiplied by
1000). ϑDE = 1, ϑFR = 1, ϑUK = 0.5.
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7 Appendix
Table 13: Macroeconomic volatility, FR-DE zone, UK, US, all shocks
Flexible UK in EMU
FR-DE UK US FR-DE UK US
Q 0.94 1.98 1.37 1.58 1.98 1.37
x 0.95 2.12 1.16 1.51 2.19 1.19
h 1.40 0.74 0.94 1.93 0.91 0.97
pi 0.91 2.04 0.89 0.90 1.81 0.83
c 1.15 2.60 1.48 1.47 2.39 1.43
q 2.32 0.81 2.51 1.07 1.24 2.05
s 3.37 1.37 3.26 0.00 0.00 2.28
Note: Standard deviation of output, Q, employment, h, CPI inflation, pi, consumption, c, terms of trade,
q and nominal exchange rate,s. In the real and nominal exchange rate rows, under each monetary regime,
the first entry refers to the EMU zone–UK, the second to the UK–US and the third one to the EMU
zone–US.
Table 14: Welfare comparisons
Flexible UK in EMU
FR-DE UK US FR-DE UK US
Supply -0.1210 -0.0337 -0.0126 -0.0642 -0.0466 -0.0156
Fiscal -0.0200 -0.0079 -0.0546 -0.0241 -0.0091 -0.0533
Money -0.0077 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.1952 -0.0074 -0.0025
All -0.1487 -0.0418 -0.0674 -0.2836 -0.0631 -0.0715
Note: The entries give the steady state consumption equivalent of the cost of fluctuations (multiplied by
1000).
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